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ABSTRACT
The capacity for normative frameworks to capture the essential
features of interactions between components in open architectures
suggests they might also be of assistance in an early, rapid proto-
typing phase of system development, helping to refine concepts,
identify actors, explore policies and evaluate feasibility. As an ex-
ercise to examine this thesis, we investigate the concept of the wire-
less grid. Wireless grids have been proposed to address the energy
issues arising from a new generation of mobile phones, the idea
being that local communication with other mobile phones, being
cheaper, can be used in combination with network communication
to achieve common goals while at the same time extending the bat-
tery duty cycle. This results in a social dilemma, as it is advan-
tageous for rational users to benefit from the energy savings with-
out any contributing to the cooperation, as every commitment has
its price. We present a necessarily simplified model, whose pur-
pose is to provide us with the foundation to explore issues in the
management of such a framework, policies to encourage collabo-
rative behaviour and the means to evaluate the effects on energy
consumption.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.4 [Computing Methodologies]: Artificial Intelligence—Knowl-
edge Representation Formalisms and Methods, Distributed Artifi-
cial Intelligence
Keywords
Wireless Grids, Answer Set Programming, Norms, Reciprocity
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper reports on a feasibility study into how and whether
institutional models can help in evaluating the concept of wireless
grids. While that is the specific topic of the paper, the broader con-
tribution is that of asking the question of how such normative model
building can be of use in an early design phase, long before hard-
ware or software is available, in order to evaluate both principles
and alternative policies — that might have significant consequences
subsequently.
In technology neutral terms, the problem we consider is of some
digital content to be distributed to a collection of nodes that sup-
port an expensive (in terms of power and money) connection via
a structured network and a cheaper connection via an ad-hoc net-
work. The task is to minimise the cost of the distribution of this
digital content by using a combination of the structured and ad-hoc
networks. The model can essentially be parameterised by the cost
functions for the (un)structured network technology. The particular
case that interests us is the forthcoming 4G mobile phone network
where the structured network uses a traditional cellular link and the
ad-hoc network uses IEEE 802.11 (wireless LAN) with the ethernet
transport protocol. The motivation for the idea of such a “wireless
grid” is that local communication over (wireless) ethernet uses sig-
nificantly less power per unit of data than communicating with the
network base-station and that duration of the battery duty cycle is
a major usability factor for users.
The deployment of third generation (3G) of mobile network sys-
tems is in progress, but a quite different next generation network
(called Fourth Generation or 4G) is under development that is in-
tended to cause a paradigm shift in the cooperation architecture
of wireless communication [14]. While for 3G the industry fo-
cused on technology for enabling voice and basic data commu-
nications (technology-centric-view), the emphasis in 4G is more
user-centric [24]. Consequently, studies to find possible drivers for
consumer demand for mobile devices, such as the one by TNS [21]
across 15 countries in mid-2004, have been conducted. This study
revealed that it was not high performance that was attractive to con-
sumers, but rather useful, convenient and enjoyable services cou-
pled with ubiquitous infrastructures for constant connection. In ad-
dition, “two days of battery life during active use” topped the wish
list of key features in 14 of the 15 countries surveyed.
Batteries have fixed capacity that puts limits on the operational
time for a device in one charge cycle. The increasing sophistica-
tion of mobile phones and their evolution into smart phones offer-
ing Internet access, imaging (still and video), audio and access to
new services, has had a significant impact on power consumption,
leading to shorter stand-by times, as well as the problem of rising
battery temperature unless there is active cooling [19].
Fitzek and Katz [9] have proposed a way around some of these
issues with the concept of a wireless grid, in which users share
resources in a peer-to-peer fashion that uses less power but this
requires a difficult to obtain collaboration between the users. The
contribution of this paper is to build an institutional model of the in-
teractions between handsets and base-station and between handsets
in order to provide a foundational model from which to be able to
explore policies, identify suitable sanctions and evaluate potential
gains from reduced power consumption.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in the next
section (2) we cover three aspects of the background, namely (i) nor-
mative frameworks, (ii) a detailed discussion of the wireless grid
scenario, and (iii) the energy model: what different agent actions
cost in terms of power consumption. Then, in section 3 we de-
scribe the action model—what the agents may do—before present-
ing some results from its analysis. We conclude in section 4 with a
discussion of the related work, results and future directions.
2. TECHNICAL CONTEXT
The first section here serves to provide a brief description of the
event-based normative framework that is used later for the model.
The second provides a detailed description of some technical issues
surrounding the wireless grid idea, highlighting in particular, actual
energy costs and the risk of free-loading, which latter has some
elements that echo issues with common-pool resource problems.
2.1 Normative Frameworks
The concept of the normative framework—sometimes also called
an institution, sometimes a virtual organisation—has become firmly
embedded in the agent community as a necessary foil to the essen-
tial autonomy of agents, in just the same way as societal conven-
tions and legal frameworks have been developed to constrain peo-
ple. In both the physical and the virtual worlds—and the emerg-
ing combination of the two—the arguments in favour centre on the
minimization of disruptive behaviour and supporting the achieve-
ment of the goals for which the normative framework has been
conceived and thus also the motivation for submission to its gover-
nance by the participants.
While the concept remains attractive, its realization in a compu-
tational setting remains a subject for research, with a wide range of
logics [1, 4, 6] and tools [20, 22, 12], to cite but a few. We do not
include an extensive and detailed case for the purpose and value
of normative frameworks here—this can be found in [23, 5], for
example.
2.1.1 Formal Model
To provide context for this paper, we give an outline of a formal
event-based model for the specification of normative frameworks
that captures all the essential properties, namely empowerment,
permission, obligation and violation. Extended presentations can
be found in the citations above.
The essential elements of our normative framework are:
1. Events (E), that bring about changes in state, and
2. Fluents (F), that characterise the state at a given instant.
The function of the framework is to define the interplay between
these concepts over time, in order to capture the evolution of a par-
ticular framework through the interaction of its participants. We
distinguish two kinds of event: normative events (Einst), that are
the events defined by the framework and exogenous (Eex), that are
outside its scope, but whose occurrence triggers normative events
in a direct reflection of the “counts-as” principle [13]. We further
partition normative events into normative actions (Eact) that denote
changes in normative state and violation events (Eviol), that sig-
nal the occurrence of violations. Violations may arise either from
explicit generation, from the occurrence of a non-permitted event,
or from the failure to fulfil an obligation. We also distinguish two
kinds of fluents: normative fluents that denote normative properties
of the state such as permissions, powers and obligations, and do-
main fluents that correspond to properties specific to the normative
framework itself.
The evolution of the state of the framework is achieved through
the definition of two relations:
1. The generation relation: this implements counts-as, in that
it specifies how the occurrence of one (exogenous or norma-
tive) event generates another (normative) event, subject to the
empowerment of the actor. Formally, this can be expressed
as G : X ×E → 2Einst , where X denotes a formula over the
(normative) state and E an event, whose confluence results in
an institutional event, and
2. The consequence relation, that specifies the initiation and ter-
mination of fluents subject to the performance of some ac-
tion in a state matching some expression, or formally C :
X × E → 2F × 2F .
Again, for the sake of context, we summarize the semantics of
our framework and cite [7] for an in-depth discussion. The seman-
tics are defined over a sequence, called a trace, of exogenous events.
Starting from the initial state, each exogenous event is responsible
for a state change, through initiation and termination of fluents, that
is achieved by a three-step process:
1. The transitive closure of G with respect to a given exogenous
event determines all the (normative) events that result
2. To this we add all violations of events not permitted and all
obligations not fulfilled, giving the set of all events whose
consequences determine the new state, so that
3. The application of C to this set of events, identifies all fluents
to initiate and terminate with respect to the current state in
order to obtain the next state.
So for each trace, we can obtain a sequence of states that constitutes
the model of the normative framework. As with human regulatory
settings, normative frameworks become useful when it is possible
to verify that particular properties are satisfied for all possible sce-
narios. In order to do so, we need to incorporate a computational
model in our formal representation.
2.1.2 Implementation
This formalisation is realized as a computational model through
Answer Set Programming [3, 11] and it is this representation that
is the subject of the evaluation process described in Section 3.2. In
[7] it was shown that the formal model of an normative framework
could be translated to an AnsProlog program—a logic program
under answer set semantics—such that the answer sets of the pro-
gram correspond to the traces of the framework. A detailed de-
scription of the mapping can be found there.
AnsProlog is a declarative knowledge representation language
that allows the programmer to describe a problem and the require-
ments on the solutions. Answer set solvers like CLASP [10] or
SMODELS [16] process the AnsProlog specification and return
the solutions, in this case the traces, as answer sets. Answer set
programming, a logic programming paradigm, permits, in contrast
to related techniques like the event calculus [15] and C+ [8], the
specification of both problem and query as an executable program,
thus eliminating the gap between specification and verification lan-
guage. But perhaps more importantly, both languages are identical,
allowing for more straightforward verification and validation.
A level of abstraction can be added using a domain-specific ac-
tion, InstAL [7], and query language, InstQL [12], which can be
both translated into AnsProlog in order to specify not only the
valid traces, but those that exhibit features of interest. We use In-
stAL to describe our scenario in Section 3. The action language
uses semi-natural language to describe the various components of
the normative framework and allows type definitions to avoid ground-
ing problems when translating toAnsProlog. For example, events
are defined by typeOfEvent event namOfEvent; with type be-
ing one of exogenous, create, inst or violation, while flu-
ents are defined by fluent nameofFluent(ParameterType,
...);. Generation of normative events from exogenous events is
specified using the generates statement, while initiates and
terminates define the two parts of the consequence relation. Con-
ditions on the state are expressed using if. The initially state-
ment serves to specify the set of fluents that characterise the initial
Figure 1: Wireless Grid Communication Architecture
state after the normative framework is created. For our model we
are interested in all traces that lead to success, so we do not require
the additional facilities of the query language InstQL. Instead we
specify the fluents or events we want to show or hide directly in
AnsProlog using the directives #show and #hide.
2.2 The Wireless Grid Scenario
2.2.1 The Wireless Grid Architecture
As described in the introduction, to overcome the energy prob-
lems of 4th generation mobile phones, Fitzek and Katz [9] proposed
the establishment of wireless grids as shown in Figure 1 [9].
In these wireless grids, ubiquitous mobile devices with poten-
tially different capabilities are expected to create ad-hoc connec-
tions and to cooperate and share their limited resources for the
benefit of the community. Cooperation between mobile devices
is achieved by short range communication link technologies, such
as WLAN or Bluetooth. Compared to the traditional cellular 3G
communication with the base-station, the advantage of the short-
range communication is much higher bandwidth while using much
less power, which we quantify in section 2.2.2. Thus, the battery
and CPU power needed on the short link is significantly lower than
it would be needed on the cellular one [19]. In this paper we will
focus on the IEEE802.11 WLAN specification, that allows mobile
devices to communicate directly with each other and according to
Perrucci et al. [19] has the highest energy saving potential.
For a better understanding of the wireless grid idea we briefly
present a scenario that we can refer back to later. This scenario is
set in a football stadium: while watching one game, the fans are
very likely to be interested in games that take place at the same
time at another place. As they cannot watch two games live at
the same time, they might use mobile phones in order to get infor-
mation about other games. A likely problem for the infrastructure
provider is that once a goal has been scored in another game, fans
want to watch the other goal on their mobile phones and all try to
stream the video file from the base station at the same time, thus
overloading it. The bandwidth of the base station connection is di-
vided into several channels that are sent out sequentially within one
time frame. Thereby — up to a certain technical maximum — each
mobile phone is allocated one slot. As the total bandwidth of a base
station is fixed, the more mobile phone users are given a slot, the
smaller the bandwidth that can be assigned to each channel gets. As
a result the download times increase, leading both to more battery
consumption and lower quality in the streaming service.
In contrast to the normal “non-cooperative” scenario in which
a single mobile phone user would need to receive all sub-streams
over the cellular link resulting in the above mentioned problems,
using the cooperation envisioned in the wireless grid scenario, users
could share the task by receiving a subset of the multicast chan-
nels over the cellular link from the base station and exchanging the
missing pieces over the short range link.
2.2.2 The Energy Advantage in IEEE802.11
To understand the IEEE802.11 WLAN wireless grid scenario
and its energy implications better, this section examines the tech-
nical aspects of WLAN transmission in more detail. We use A to
denote the set of agents in the scenario. In considering the energy
implications of the wireless grid scenario, we observe the following
basic definition of energy [E], that states that energy consumption
in terms of battery depends on two factors: the power [P ] con-
sumed per connection type and the time [t] needed for the actual
transmission:
Energy = Power ∗ T ime [Joules] (1)
So what is the energy consumption in this scenario? The total en-
ergy consumption is the energy consumed over the tradition cellu-
lar 3G connection (E3G) plus that over the short link (i.e. WLAN)
connection (EWLAN ) plus as the idle time for both links (Eidle).
In case of no cooperation the latter costs 0, i.e. it is assumed that the
WLAN connection is turned off and the football fan has to stream
the complete video using the 3G connection. In case of wireless
grid cooperation it is assumed that both connections (WLAN and
3G) are turned on and the devices help one another in a peer-to-
peer-like fashion. Assuming |ACoop| cooperating agents in the sce-
narios for example, each agent only needs to stream only a part of
the total video from the base station (i.e. 1|ACoop| in an ideal sce-
nario) and obtain the missing chunks from the other cooperation
partners using the short link connection. Therefore the energy con-
sumption in the cooperation case (ECoop) comprises that consumed
for:
1. Streaming part of the video from the base station using the
3G link (E3G,rx) (plus the energy consumed while the 3G
connection is idle (E3G,i)),
2. Receiving the remaining chunks of the video on the WLAN
connection (EWLAN,rx),
3. Sending the own chunks to the other participants via the
WLAN connection (EWLAN,tx), and
4. Idling (i.e. when not transmitting or receiving anything but
waiting for the next interaction) (EWLAN,i).
With reference to equation 1, by replacing theE with the respec-
tive P ∗t-values, one can analyse the power consumption as well as
the transmission times for the scenario in the cooperative and non-
cooperative case in detail. Representative power and time values
for the transmission in the different states using 3G and WLAN
connection can be found in [19, p.D10] for example, which are
based on measurements from a Nokia N95. These numbers indicate
that although the power needed for the WLAN and the 3G state are
about the same, for a point-to-point communication, the data rate
for the 3G link (0.193 Mbit/s for the receiving state) is significantly
lower than that of WLAN (5.115 Mbit/s, receiving state, 30m dis-
tance) leading to significantly worse transmission times and con-
sequently a much worse energy per bit ratio for the 3G link. The
energy consumed in the idle states is of secondary importance and
therefore neglected here.
This suggests that the cooperation scenario has a significant po-
tential advantage in energy consumption, compared to the conven-
tional cellular communication architecture, especially if the num-
ber of cooperating mobile phones is high and a large proportion of
the data transmission can be done via the short-link connection.
Figure 2: The Reciprocity Problem in Wireless Grids
2.2.3 The Reciprocity Problem in Wireless Grids
Although the wireless grid may have a huge advantage with re-
gard to the battery consumption, it also has the intrinsic weakness
of distributed cooperative architectures: it relies on cooperation to
succeed. The cooperation idea in the wireless grid, as shown in
figure 2(a), is as follows:
1. The participants volunteer their resources, forming a com-
mon pool which can be used by all of them in order to achieve
a common goal, such as file streaming. The utility which
users can obtain from the pooled resources is much higher
than they can obtain on their own. For example, in the foot-
ball stadium scenario, both download time and battery con-
sumption are reduced. However, the problem is that com-
mitment comes at a cost, in the form of battery consumption
for sending file chunks, i.e. EWLAN,tx. As a consequence,
(bounded) rational users would prefer to access the resources
without any commitment of their own, as shown in figure 2.
2. Thus, as shown in (b), the grey agent in the top left corner
(with blindfold) can enjoy the full benefits from the common
pool without committing anything itself, hence cheating on
the three other agents.
However, if a substantial number of users follows this selfish
strategy, the network itself would be at stake, depriving all users of
the benefits [17]. The reason for this is straightforward: network
users can have strategic behaviour and are not necessarily obedi-
ently cooperating by making their resources available without the
prospect of rewards for their good behaviour. Unreciprocated, there
is no inherent value to cooperation for a user. A lone cooperating
user draws no benefit from its cooperation, even if the rest of the
network does. Guaranteed cost paired with uncertainty or even lack
of any resulting benefit does not induce cooperation in a (bounded)
rational, utility-maximising user. Without any further incentives,
rational users therefore would not cooperate in such an environ-
ment and all be worse off than if they cooperated [2].
2.2.4 The Energy Model
Utility quantification is being used by the (bounded rational)
agents (i.e. agents that only have partial information about their
environment, including other agents) to determine the utility of the
different possible actions and choose their actions in such as way
that maximises their utility. Concerning the knowledge that they
can rely on when calculating utilities, we assume the agents not to
have knowledge of the whole system, but only the small part of it
in their vicinity.
We now explain how the agents determine the utility of an action,
using the football stadium scenario described earlier. However, to
keep the example simple, for the utility considerations we consider
the interaction of two agents only and formulate the costs in such a
way that they can easily be expanded to any number of agents.
The two agents both want to stream the same file G in the sta-
dium. In order to get the complete file, they can cooperate and
thereby reduce their energy consumption or stream the file them-
selves using a cellular link connection. The exchange is done in
chunks (g ∈ G).
As described above, the issue in the particular wireless grid sce-
nario that we consider here is that the different agents have different
subsets of G (i.e. parts of the file) already and each is trying to ob-
tain the full set by exchanging parts of their subsets of G with one
another. Thus, looking at a potential exchange, from the perspec-
tive of an agent ai, for each chunk only two mutually exclusive sit-
uations can occur: either the agent does, or does not, have a given
chunk. This can be expressed in terms of the set Hai (the set of
chunks agent ai has; Hai ⊆ G) and the corresponding comple-
ment set (with respect to G) H ′ai that represents the set of chunks
agent ai has not.
In an exchange, an agent a1 will try to obtain the set of the miss-
ing chunks H ′1 and in turn can potentially provide the set H1. Let
H2 being the chunks agent a2 possesses and let agent a1 and a2
enter an exchange process (H1 ∪H2 ⊆ G). In order to reflect the
local connectivity properties, we write Aa1 (⊆ A) to denote those
aj ∈ A, j 6= i that are within communication range of ai. The
local radius of each agent is determined by the transaction protocol
dependent signal radius of its mobile phone.
What is important to the agent now are the utilities of the differ-
ent action alternatives. Thus, an agent needs to consider the utility
of using the short-link cooperation (including the costs for search-
ing short-link cooperation partners in the first place) compared to
the cellular link as well as the utility of reciprocating in contrast to
cheating on other agents.
The search costs are those that accumulate as a result of the
agents searching for the missing chunks. We assume that the costs
of sending out a request message (RM) for cooperation using WLAN
transmission are fixed and independent of the number of chunks
requested. However, the number of messages an agent has to send
before it finds an agent that is willing to cooperate and one that can
supply at least one missing chunks depends on the success proba-
bility p = f(
∣∣A∣∣ , H ′); p ∈ [0, 1] for a single message. We define
“success” to mean finding a cooperation partner with at least one
missing chunk. As stated above, the probability p is a result of the
function of the number of agents in the neighbourhood
∣∣A∣∣ and of
the number of chunks missing H ′. As yet, we have no measure of
how these two quantities are related, but we can make some general
observations about their correlation. Thus, for the missing chunks,
we contend, without evidence at this point, that p has a propor-
tional relation with the missing chunks of the form H ′ai ∝ p. Our
rationale starts from the assumption that the chunks are distributed
uniformly over all agents. Thus, if missing many chunks an agent
is more likely to find another agent that can offer any of the missing
chunks, whereas the probability is lower if it is only missing a small
number of specific chunks. Besides the number of missing chunks,
p is furthermore dependent on the number of agents in the neigh-
bourhood, i.e. the number of other agents
∣∣Aai ∣∣ an agent ai can
see locally1. The probability p is proportional to
∣∣A∣∣ as well. The
intuition is that the higher the agent population density, the higher
the probability of finding an agents that responds positively to the
request when searching for the chunks.
1For reasons of simplicity it is assumed that the number of agents in
the neighbourhood has no volatility, but remains the same through-
out the process.
To give an example for p, in a football-stadium where many peo-
ple are in one place and want to download the same file (e.g. a re-
play of a goal), it will approach 1 as there are many people search-
ing for and offering the same chunks, while it tends to approach 0
when there are fewer people searching for and offering the same
chunks. Once an agent has found a transaction partner, they can
exchange chunks. Thus the maximum number of chunks available
for exchange is the intersection of the set an agent can offer to the
transaction partner (i.e. all the chunks it has) and that the transac-
tion partner needs; and vice versa, i.e. H1 ∩H ′2 & H2 ∩H ′1.
Returning to the example, in the course of the exchange both
agents have the option to cooperate (i.e. deliver what they promised)
or defect and not send their chunks. As a consequence of this,
two different utility situations can occur. Thus, in the coopera-
tion case, based on opportunity cost considerations, the utility is
calculated by taking into account what it would have cost for an
agent to download the chunks from the base station using the 3G
connection (E3G,rx) reduced by the costs of receiving the chunks
on a short range WLAN link from another agent (EWLAN,rx) mi-
nus the costs for sending its own chunks (EWLAN,tx). The latter
cost can be saved by the agent if it defects. However, assuming
that the transaction partner stops the transaction if being cheated
and no further chunks are be exchanged (tit-for-tat), in this case
the agent will have search for a new transaction partner for the re-
maining missing chunks. This results in search costs that could
otherwise have been saved. The specific energy cost Ea,b where
a ∈ WLAN, 3G; b ∈ tx, rx, idle have already been determined
by Perrucci et al. [18] for single bits. As a first approximation,
using a constant bpc (i.e. bits per chunk) these could be mapped to
the chunks in the model.
Using the bpc mapping and the figures by Perrucci et al. and
substituting them with the variables of our utility considerations an
agent is able to compute an utility for all the actions available and
decide on the action to take as a consequence.
3. FORMALIZING THE WIRELESS GRID
SCENARIO
Now that we have explained the wireless grid scenario in some
detail from the technological perspective, we now shift focus to the
normative framework.
We observe three perspectives to the wireless grid scenario:
1. The actions that agents may take, as prescribed by the nor-
mative framework,
2. The utility functions that quantify battery costs for a given
action, and
3. The agents that populate the normative frameworks and choose
which action to take, informed by the utility functions.
In this paper, our focus is on the (normative) actions and the util-
ity functions (see section 2.2.4): we will address their integration
through the agents that participate in the normative framework in
future work.
3.1 The Normative Framework
The model is preliminary in that it focusses on the essential in-
teractions and the communication costs that arise from those inter-
actions. Although a more elaborate model is desirable from a real-
istic point of view, more details would also distract and complicate
while not adding to the presentation.
The features of the the prototypical scenario are:
• 1 × base-station: B
• m × agents: A = {a1, . . . , am}
• 1 × digital good: G divided into
• n × chunks: {g1, . . . , gn}
We further assume that n|m, which is to say the number of chunks
is a multiple of the number of agents.
3.1.1 Negotiation, obtaining and sharing
We identify three phases to the interactions for handset to base-
station and handset to handset:
• Negotiation: assign gi to aj s.t. f : G→ A and
f−1 : A→ Gn|m s.t. f−1(ai) = {gj , f(gj) = ai}
• Obtaining: agent ai receives chunks f−1(ai) from B
• Sharing: agent ai sends chunks f−1(ai) to and receives
chunks G \ f−1(ai) from other agents.
These three phases are distinct, but although negotiation must
come first, obtaining and sharing can be interleaved as soon as
downloading has commenced. In the following paragraphs we dis-
cuss each phase in more detail and how each is encoded in InstAL.
Each InstAL specification starts with the identification of the
normative framework, the different types of variables it will use
(their values can be specified in a domain file) and the fluents and
events it will recognise. The full definition can be seen in Figure 3.
The meaning of the various elements is explained as we progress
through the different phases.
Negotiation Phase:.
We are not particularly concerned with the technicalities of the
negotiation phase—any off-the-shelf protocol could be employed—
as long as the post-condition is satisfied: that each chunk is as-
signed to exactly one agent and that each agent is assigned the
same number of chunks—although these conditions can readily be
relaxed at the cost of a lengthier specification. An allocation sat-
isfying these conditions is given in the initial state of the model
(see Figure 6, lines 104–105) via the obtainChunk fluents indi-
cating which agents are tasked with obtaining which blocks from
the base-station. Together with their chunk assignment the agents
receive the necessary permission to do so (lines 102–103).
Obtaining Phase:.
This is where each agent downloads its assigned chunks from
the base-station. This process should result in each agent holding
n|m distinct chunks. Because the base-station uses several dif-
ferent frequencies (frequency division multiplexing), many agents
may download chunks simultaneously. We refer to a frequency di-
vision in the model as a channel. Of course, there is a physical
limit to the number of frequency divisions and hence the number
of simultaneous agent connections. The full specification of this
phase can be seen in Figure 4. Each agent can only physically ob-
tain one chunk at a time from the base station, while each channel
can only be used to obtain one chunk. This is modelled by the
fluent cbusy. The first InstAL rule (lines 34–36) indicates that a
request to obtain a chunk is granted (intObtain) whenever there
is an available channel and the agent is not busy obtaining another
chunk. When a block is obtained the agent and the channel will
become busy for a fixed amount of time — 2 time steps in this case
(lines 42–43). From the first instant of the agent interacting with
the base station, it is deemed to have obtained the block, so parts
can be shared (line 41). As soon as a channel and an agent become
engaged, the framework takes away the power from the agent and
from the channel to engage in any other interactions (lines 53–54),
stops the agent from needing the chunk and cancels the permission
to obtain the chunk again later on (lines 55 and 56, respectively).
Each exogenous event generates a transition to mark the pass-
ing of time (lines 38–39). The clock event indicates that no agent
was interacting with the normative framework. The transition
event reduces the duration of the interaction between the chan-
nel and agent (line 46). When the interaction comes to an end,
transition restores the power for agents to obtain chunks via the
channel and for the agent to obtain more chunks (lines 48–51). The
event also terminates any busy fluents that are no longer needed
(line 58).
Sharing Phase:.
In this phase each agent shares its chunks with another agent,
with the goal that at the end of the process, each agent has a com-
plete set of the chunks. The full specification can be found in Fig-
ure 5. The principle here is more or less the same as with obtaining
blocks, only that we build in a mechanism to encourage agents to
share their chunks with others rather than just downloading them.
To be able to monitor the different costs of obtaining a chunk from
the base-station or from a peer, we introduced the fluent abusy.
When a chunk is downloaded from a peer, the agent loses permis-
sion to download another chunk until it has shared a chunk with
another agent (lines 85 and 73 respectively). Continuous down-
loading without sharing (no permission is granted to download) re-
sults in a violation event named misuse (line 70). The penalty we
chose to implement in our model is that the violation agent loses the
power to intDownload (Line 91), which means that for all intents
and purposes it has been expelled from the peer group. Initially,
agents are given the permission and power to download one chunk
(Figure 6 lines 112-114).
Figures 3 to 6 give the complete characterisation of our wire-
less grid scenario. When translated to AnsProlog and combined
with the non-framework-dependent program components, we ob-
tain all the possible traces over a specified number of time in-
stances. A successful trace makes sure that at the end all agents
have all chunks and are no longer engaged. Figure 7 shows a
graphical representation of a successful trace for a scenario with
two agents (bob and alice), four chunks (x1, x2, x3 and x4) and a
base-station with two channels (c1 and c2). The circles indicate the
time steps. Light grey fill means the device is cbusy while dark
grey indicates abusy. The arrows indicate which block goes to
which agent. The labels on the left-hand side indicate the exoge-
nous event and the current distribution of chunks. The observed
event clock is not shown to avoid cluttering the diagram.
3.1.2 Sanctioning
The model as presented in Figure 5 takes a rather harsh position
on sanctioning, in that the violating agent is expelled—the power to
get chunks from other agents is rescinded. In fact, this is both harsh
and counter-productive, because given the initial state shown in
Figure 6, the chunk assignment is not 1-resilient—meaning the dis-
tribution cannot be achieved following the expulsion of one agent,
unless in the very special case where the expulsion occurs after the
other agent no longer requires any chunks from this agent. Full
1-resilient assignment can be achieved with two chunks for each
of three agents, in which each chunk is assigned to two agents and
of course, n-resilience can be achieved by each agent downloading
all the chunks from the base-station. In terms of the effect on the
group goal, the ejection scenario is equivalent to one of the agents
1 institution grid;
2
3 type Agent;
4 type Chunk;
5 type Time;
6 type Channel;
7 type ConnectionPoint;
8
9 exogenous event clock;
10 exogenous event obtain(Agent,Chunk,Channel);
11 exogenous event download(Agent,Agent,Chunk);
12
13 create event creategrid;
14
15 inst event intObtain(Agent,Chunk,Channel);
16 inst event intShare(Agent);
17 inst event intDownload(Agent,Chunk);
18 inst event transition;
19
20 violation event misuse(Agent);
21
22 fluent obtainChunk(Agent,Chunk);
23 fluent hasChunk(Agent,Chunk);
24 fluent abusy(Agent,Time);
25 fluent cbusy(ConnectionPoint,Time);
26
27 fluent previous(Time,Time);
28 fluent matchA(Agent,ConnectionPoint);
29 fluent matchC(Channel,ConnectionPoint);
Figure 3: Declaration of types and events in the model
34 obtain(A,X,C) generates intObtain(A,X,C)
35 if not cbusy(C1,T1), not cbusy(A1,T2),
36 matchA(A,A1), matchC(C,C1);
37
38 obtain(A,X,C) generates transition;
39 clock generates transition;
40
41 intObtain(A,X,C) initiates hasChunk(A,X);
42 intObtain(A,X,C) initiates
43 cbusy(A1,2), cbusy(C1,2)
44 if matchA(A,A1), matchC(C,C1);
45
46 transition initiates cbusy(A,T2)
47 if cbusy(A,T1), previous(T1,T2);
48 transition initiates pow(intObtain(A,X,C))
49 if cbusy(A1,1), matchA(A,A1);
50 transition initiates pow(intObtain(A,X,C))
51 if cbusy(C1,1), matchC(C,C1);
52
53 intObtain(A,X,C) terminates pow(intObtain(A,X1,C1));
54 intObtain(A,X,C) terminates pow(intObtain(B,X1,C));
55 intObtain(A,X,C) terminates obtainChunk(A,X);
56 intObtain(A,X,C) terminates perm(obtain(A,X,C1));
57
58 transition terminates cbusy(A,Time);
Figure 4: Generation and consequence relations for obtaining
63 download(A,B,X) generates
64 intDownload(A,X), intShare(B)
65 if hasChunk(B,X), not abusy(A,T1), not abusy(B,T2);
66
67 download(A,B,X) generates transition;
68 clock generates transition;
69
70 viol(intDownload(A,X)) generates misuse(A);
71
72 intDownload(A,X) initiates hasChunk(A,X);
73 intShare(B) initiates perm(intDownload(B,X));
74 intDownload(A,X) initiates abusy(A,3);
75 intShare(B) initiates abusy(B,3);
76
77
78 transition initiates abusy(A,T2)
79 if abusy(A,T1), previous(T1,T2);
80 transition initiates pow(intDownload(A,X))
81 if abusy(A,1);
82 transition initiates pow(intShare(B))
83 if abusy(B,1);
84
85 intDownload(A,X) terminates perm(intDownload(A,X));
86 intDownload(A,X) terminates pow(intDownload(A,X));
87 intDownload(A,X) terminates pow(intShare(A));
88 intShare(B) terminates pow(intDownload(B,X));
89 intShare(B) terminates pow(intShare(B));
90
91 misuse(A) terminates pow(intDownload(A,X)),abusy(A,T);
92 intDownload(A,X) terminates perm(intDownload(A,Y));
93
94 transition terminates abusy(A,Time);
Figure 5: Generation and consequence relations for sharing
leaving the ad-hoc network. In either case, for an a-priori solution
there is a trade-off to be explored in delivering i-resilience, based
on the estimated number agent failures and on the additional cost of
replicated base-station downloads. Alternatively, some agents may
engage autonomously in additional base-station downloads for the
sake of the group goal.
A more practical sanction may be to lock the offending agent out
of the sharing process for a number of time steps, but as with the
above scenario, this is only effective if it does not impact the group
goal.
3.2 Evaluation
Now that we have set out the normative framework and how
to quantify communication costs for the particular situation of a
3G structured network and an ethernet ad-hoc network (see sec-
tion 2.2.4), we can use the model to examine the traces for ex-
pected, but also unexpected behaviour and, simply by counting the
number of cbusy and abusy states, get an estimate for battery con-
sumption under different initial conditions.
Each of the models of our framework contains information about
the energy consumption of each of agents in the form of the mes-
sages they have been passing signalled by the exogenous events
obtain and download and the amount of time they have been
spending communicating with the base-station, by the number of
occurrences of cbusy, and communicating with the other agent by
the number of times abusy occurs.
The model is presently being used as an off-line tool and gen-
erates all possible traces. The likelihood of a high proportion of
these trace occurring in practice, depends on the relative intelli-
gence and (bounded) rationality of the agents participating in the
normative framework, e.g. continuously trying the download a
chunk when you are busy. Our model purposely avoids modelling
handset behaviour—we believe that is responsibility of the handset
designer—because our objective is the exploration of the design of
the space in which the handsets interact. However, these unsuccess-
ful or unnatural traces can easily be filtered out by adding the filter
displayed in Figures 8 and 9 to the AnsProlog specification. The
first filter only admits those traces that lead to success: all agents
have all the chunks and are no longer busy. When adding the filter,
we obtain the first traces after nine time steps. To be more precise
we obtain 142368 different traces satisfying the criteria. CLINGO
returns these in 22.96 second, excluding printing, on a standard lap-
top. When the second filter is added to the first, we only obtain suc-
cessful traces that contain no violations and where each exogenous
event leads to its corresponding normative event. This reduces the
number of traces significantly. Traces are only returned after fifteen
time steps, after which 5280 of them are returned in 3.58 seconds.
If we do not constrain each download and obtain to be followed
by its normative equivalent, we get over three million traces.
By changing the durations for obtaining and sharing chunks and
altering the penalties imposed on agents not conforming to the
norms, we are able to study a variety of situations and finding the
most appropriate enforcement mechanisms.
Furthermore some model assumption need to be reconsidered.
The model at the moment demands that sending and receiving al-
ternate. In reality this is might not always be the case. Handsets
should be allowed to take advantages of chunks being sent even
when the same number of chunks have not yet been shared. Thus,
it would be more realistic to evaluate a handset’s willingness to
collaborate over a larger time period.
4. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have presented a normative framework as a
mechanism to help understand and to model the economic chal-
lenges that might arise in the context of a wireless grid. We have
developed a model for the actions of the agents that participate
in such a grid and hence provide us with a basic energy model,
that may be used by the agents as part of a utility maximization
decision-making process.
This was the first time we had modelled a complete, but sim-
plified, realistic scenario of a normative framework. While In-
stALis very intuitive and makes the task significantly more ap-
proachable it still lacks certain features that would make the mod-
elling process easier. To model that channels and handsets were
busy during a given period we had to resort to introducing the fluent
previous, as InstALdoes not allow arithmetic in its rules (which
the underlying AnsProlog does allow). The current version of
InstALalso does not allow hierarchies in its type structure or poly-
morphic propositions. Ideally we would have liked Device to be a
superset of both Channel and Agent, such that we would not have
had to resort to the matchC and matchA fluents, which are a techni-
cal artifice to overcome a linguistic weakness. The answer sets rep-
resenting the traces contain significant numbers of atoms, making
debugging difficult. Neither InstALnor InstQLhave built-in mech-
anisms to filter the output. So for debugging purposes we often
referred to the underlying AnsProlog program and its #show and
#hide functionalities, although those are not very flexible. Thus,
the exercise has identified a number of practical issues that need to
be addressed to make InstALmore usable.
The modelling of the wireless grid scenario gave us also a good
insight into our formal model. The model does not allow us to
expel an agent completely from a normative framework, as all the
observed events are automatically empowered. While this can be
partially remedied by removing the empowerment of consequent
normative events, as we have done in the sharing phase, it raises
interesting issues on how membership of a normative framework
should be handled.
The traces of the normative framework give an indication of how
much energy each of the handsets will be using when the trace
would be executed. It also allows us to test different sanctioning
techniques and compare their efficiency. However, a number of the
traces that are produced by our simple model, while valid, stand
very little chance of being executed by rational agents. Agents
are not going to repeatedly downloading the same block, trying to
download/obtain a block when they were busy. While this can be
easily added to the model, we believe that this should be encoded
by the agents rather the normative framework. From a normative
perspective we are only interested in correct, valid traces.
A particularly intriguing line of research, arising from the capac-
ity to compute such traces, is to explore those (economic) mecha-
nisms that might alleviate the effects of free-loading, in a more sub-
tle, and less draconian way, than the simple sanction of expelling,
that has been applied here.
Both the wireless grid scenario and the energy model are nec-
essarily simplified and demand expansion. As stated earlier in the
paper some functions such as the one defining p, i.e. the probability
of finding a cooperation partner that has the right chunks, have to
be specified. Further aspects of interest to be included in the model
are error rates on the different communication links as well as the
aspect that agents are moving within the environment and as a con-
sequence the neighbourhood of an agent is constantly changing.
Furthermore, our current model has very simple penalty mech-
anisms for violating agents. It does not allow for more elaborate
forms of sanctions as was demonstrated in Section 3.1.2 when we
blocked agents that obtained unallocated chunks from the base-
station. However, with regard to future work we plan to develop
several enforcement mechanisms in order to address the reciprocity
problem in more detail. The idea thereby is to take the existing
model as a reference point and analyse the additional benefits and
costs resulting from different normative mechanisms.
Acknowledgements: Tina Balke is partially supported by a grant
from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).
5. REFERENCES
[1] A. Artikis, M. Sergot, and J. Pitt. Specifying electronic
societies with the Causal Calculator. In F. Giunchiglia,
J. Odell, and G. Weiss, editors, Proceedings of AOSE),
LNCS 2585. Springer, 2003.
[2] R. Axelrod. The emergence of cooperation among egoists.
The American Political Science Review, 75(2):306–318,
1981.
[3] C. Baral. Knowledge Representation, Reasoning and
Declarative Problem Solving. Cambridge Press, 2003.
[4] G. Boella and L. van der Torre. Constitutive Norms in the
Design of Normative Multiagent Systems, City College. In
Proceedings of CLIMA-VI), 2005.
[5] O. Cliffe. Specifying and Analysing Institutions in
Multi-Agent Systems using Answer Set Programming. PhD
thesis, University of Bath, 2007.
[6] O. Cliffe, M. De Vos, and J. Padget. Answer set
programming for representing and reasoning about virtual
institutions. In K. Inoue, S. Ken, and F. Toni, editors, CLIMA
VII, volume 4371 of LNAI, pages 60–79, 2006. Springer.
[7] O. Cliffe, M. De Vos, and J. Padget. Specifying and
reasoning about multiple institutions. In P. Noriega,
J. Vázquez-Salceda, G. Boella, O. Boissier, V. Dignum,
N. Fornara, and E. Matson, editors, Coordination,
Organization, Institutions and Norms in Agent Systems II -
AAMAS 2006 and ECAI 2006 International Workshops,
COIN 2006, volume 4386 of LNCS, pages 67–85. Springer
Berlin / Heidelberg, 2007.
[8] Enrico Giunchiglia, Joohyung Lee, Vladimir Lifschitz,
Norman McCain, and Hudson Turner. Nonmonotonic causal
theories. Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 153, pp. 49-104, 2004.
[9] F. H. P. Fitzek and M. D. Katz. Cellular controlled peer to
peer communications: Overview and potentials. In F. H. P.
Fitzek and M. D. Katz, editors, Cognitive Wireless Networks,
pages 31–59. Springer, 2007.
[10] M. Gebser, B. Kaufmann, A. Neumann, and T. Schaub.
Conflict-Driven Answer Set Solving. In Proceeding of
IJCAI07, pages 386–392, 2007.
[11] M. Gelfond and V. Lifschitz. Classical negation in logic
programs and disjunctive databases. New Generation
Computing, 9(3-4):365–386, 1991.
[12] L. Hopton, O. Cliffe, M. De Vos, and J. Padget. Instql: A
query language for virtual institutions using answer set
programming. In J. Dix, M. Fisher, and P. Novàk, editors,
Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on
Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems (ClimaX), IfI
Technical Report Series, pages 87–104, 2009. Institut für
Informatik, Technische Universität Clausthal.
[13] A. J. Jones and M. Sergot. A Formal Characterisation of
Institutionalised Power. ACM Computing Surveys,
28(4es):121, 1996.
[14] M. D. Katz and F. H. P. Fitzek. Cooperation in 4g networks -
cooperation in a heterogenous wireless world. In F. H. P.
Fitzek and M. D. Katz, editors, Cooperation in Wireless
Networks: Principles and Applications, pages 463–496.
Springer, 2006.
[15] R. A. Kowalski and F. Sadri. Reconciling the event calculus
with the situation calculus. Journal of Logic Programming,
31(1–3):39–58, Apr. 1997.
[16] I. Niemelä and P. Simons. Smodels: An implementation of
the stable model and well-founded semantics for normal LP.
In J. Dix, U. Furbach, and A. Nerode, editors, Proceedings of
LPNMR’97, volume 1265 of LNAI, pages 420–429,1997.
Springer.
[17] E. Ostrom. Coping with tragedies of the commons. Annual
Review of Political Science, 2:493–535, June 1999.
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis; Center
for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental
Change.
[18] G. P. Perrucci and F. Fitzek. Measurements campaign for
energy consumption on mobile phones. Technical report,
Aalborg University, 2009.
[19] G. P. Perrucci, F. H. Fitzek, and M. V. Petersen. Energy
saving aspects for mobile device exploiting heterogeneous
wireless networks. In Heterogeneous Wireless Access
Networks. Springer US, 2009.
[20] M. Sergot. (C+)++: An Action Language for Representing
Norms and Institutions. Technical report, Imperial College,
London, 2004.
[21] TNS. Two-day batter life tops wish list for future all-in-one
phone device. Technical report, Taylor Nelson Sofres, 004.
[22] J. Vázquez-Salceda, V. Dignum, and F. Dignum. Organizing
multiagent systems. AAMAS, 11(3):307–360, 2005.
[23] Virginia Dignum. A Model for Organizational Interaction
Based on Agents, Founded in Logic. PhD thesis, Utrecht
University, 2004.
[24] K. Wrona and P. Mähönen. Analytical model of cooperation
in ad hoc networks. Telecommunication Systems,
27(2–4):347–369, 2004.
98 initially
99 pow(transition), perm(transition),
100 perm(clock),
101 pow(intObtain(A,B,C)),perm(intObtain(A,B,C)),
102 perm(obtain(alice,x1,C)), perm(obtain(alice,x3,C)),
103 perm(obtain(bob,x2,C)), perm(obtain(bob,x4,C)),
104 obtainChunk(alice,x1), obtainChunk(alice,x3),
105 obtainChunk(bob,x2), obtainChunk(bob,x4);
109 initially
110 pow(transition), perm(transition),
111 perm(clock),
112 pow(intDownload(Agent,Chunk)), pow(intShare(Agent)),
113 perm(download(Agent,Agent1,Chunk)),
114 perm(intDownload(Agent,Chunk)), perm(intShare(Agent));
Figure 6: Initial state of the model, post negotiation
C1 C2 Alice Bob
x1observed(obtain(alice,x1,c1),i01)
alice={},bob={}
x2observed(obtain(bob,x2,c2),i02)
alice={x1},bob={}
x1observed(download(bob,alice,x1),i03)
alice={x1},bob={x2}
x3observed(obtain(alice,x3,c1),i04)
alice={x1},bob={x2,x1}
alice={x1,x3},bob={x2}
x4observed(obtain(bob,x4,c2),i06)
alice={x1,x3},bob={x2,x1}
x2observed(download(alice,bob,x2),i07)
alice={x1,x3},bob={x2,x1,x4}
alice={x1,x3,x2},bob={x1,x2,x4}
alice={x1,x3,x2},bob={x1,x2,x4}
alice={x1,x3,x2},bob={x1,x2,x4}
x3observed(download(bob,alice,x3),i11)
alice={x1,x3},bob={x2,x1,x4}
alice={x1,x3,x2},bob={x2,x1,x4,x3}
alice={x1,x3,x2},bob={x2,x1,x4,x3}
alice={x1,x3,x2},bob={x2,x1,x4,x3}
x4observed(download(alice,bob,x4),i15)
alice={x1},bob={x2}
alice={x1,x3,x2,x4},bob={x2,x1,x4,x3}
alice={x1,x3,x2},bob={x2,x1,x4,x3}
alice={x1,x3,x2,x4},bob={x2,x1,x4,x3}
alice={x1,x3,x2,x4},bob={x2,x1,x4,x3}
Figure 7: One trace of the interaction between alice, bob and
the channels of base-station
1 % success criteria
2 success :- holdsat(hasChunk(alice,x1),T),holdsat(hasChunk(alice,x2),T),
3 holdsat(hasChunk(alice,x3),T),holdsat(hasChunk(alice,x4),T),
4 holdsat(hasChunk(bob,x1),T),holdsat(hasChunk(bob,x2),T),
5 holdsat(hasChunk(bob,x3),T),holdsat(hasChunk(bob,x4),T),
6 not holdsat(cbusy(dbob,T),F),not holdsat(cbusy(dalice,T),F),
7 not holdsat(cbusy(dc1,T),F), not holdsat(cbusy(dc2,T),F),
8 not holdsat(abusy(alice,T),F),not holdsat(abusy(bob,T),F),final(F).
Figure 8: A filter to remove unsuccessful traces
10 % only interested in successful traces
11 :- not success.
12
13 % indication that a violation has occurred
14 viol :- occured(viol(X),I).
15
16 :- viol.
17
18 % exogenous event should be follow by corresponding normative event
19 :- occured(download(H1,H2,Chunk),T), not occured(intDownload(H1,Chunk),T).
20 :- occured(obtain(Handset,Chunk,Channel),T),
21 not occured(intObtain(Handset,Chunk,Channel),T).
Figure 9: A filter to remove unsuccessful violation traces with
unintuitive events
